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INTELSAT
INTRODUCTION
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN-
TELSAT)' is a non-profit cooperative that owns and operates a global
commercial satellite system.2 The Organization consists of one hundred
and ten member countries with representatives chosen to make admin-
istrative decisions on their government's behalf.3 INTELSAT's aim is
to provide a communication satellite system to the entire world commu-
nity on a non-discriminatory basis.
Although INTELSAT has been able to maintain a "monopoly" in
international satellite communications, recent developments in the field
of international telecommunications threaten to jeopardize that posi-
tion. Not only must INTELSAT contend with technological advances
in optical fiber transmission facilities,5 but it now also must prepare
1. Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion (INTELSAT), with annexes, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No.
7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Agreement]; Operating Agreement Relating to
the International Telecommunication Satellite Organization, with annexes, done Aug.
20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 40091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Oper-
ating Argeement]. These two multilateral treaties established INTELSAT.
2. See INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 1, at art. IV. INTELSAT
operates on a commercial basis as each system user, whether a member of the organi-
zation or not, pays for the services it receives. Id. Accordingly, INTELSAT member's
investment entitles it to part ownership and guarantees that member a return on its net
investment. Id.
3. Se INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. VII. INTELSAT is organized
into four operating units. Id. The Assembly of Parties is the main organ and is com-
posed of representatives of the member country governments with each representative
having one vote. The Meeting of Signatories includes all governments or their desig-
nated telecommunication entities that have signed the Operating Agreement. See IN-
TELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 1, at art. VIII. Similar to the procedure of
the Assembly, each signatory has one vote. Id. The Board of Governors, acting as the
executive branch of INTELSAT, is composed of those Operating Agreement signato-
ries that have achieved the minimum share requirements determined annually by the
Meeting of Signatories. Id. The Board is responsible for all decisions concerning the
development, operation and maintenance of INTELSAT satellites. Id. at art. IX. The
final unit is INTELSAT's staff, headed by the Director General, who manages and
oversees'INTELSAT's daily operations. Id.
4. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at preamble (observing that one of
the principle goals of INTELSAT is to provide communication by means of satellite to
all nations of the world on a non-discriminatory basis). Any nation seeking membership
into INTELSAT, therefore, must agree to promote these aims. Id. at art. 11(a).
5. W. STOVER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE THIRD WORLD 34 (1984) (dis-
cussing the impact optical fibers would have in that they would permit large amounts
of information to be transmitted through glass tubes wrapped in cables and placed
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itself for inevitable competition with entirely separate international sat-
ellite systems.6
This Article examines these current developments in international
telecommunications and considers the possible impact they will likely
have on INTELSAT. More specifically, the Article focuses on the re-
cent United States initiative to encourage its private corporations to
infiltrate those satellite markets traditionally reserved for INTELSAT.
The Article will also briefly discuss the recent breakthroughs in fiber
optics technology and its potential impact on INTELSAT's satellite
system. Lastly, the Article will identify other events that have and will
continue to affect INTELSAT.
I. INTELSAT AND THE NEW COMPETITION FROM
PRIVATE SATELLITE CORPORATIONS
A. IMPACT OF NEW UNITED STATES POLICY ON INTELSAT
Private United States corporations' attempts to establish their own
satellite systems raises a number of foreign policy questions for the Ex-
ecutive Branch because of the United States' commitment to the IN-
TELSAT Agreement.7 Several foreign policy-makers, therefore, re-
quested that the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) delay its
authorization decision of the first application for the private develop-
ment of such a system until after they reviewed the matter. On Novem-
ber 28, 1984, President Reagan declared that the development of sepa-
rate international satellite systems is in the United States' national
interest.8 The President qualified this declaration, however, with a sug-
gestion9 that the FCC impose two restrictions on private firms seeking
to operate such systems. The United States Departments of State and
underground or underwater, making them a viable alterative to the use of satellites).
See also infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the fiber optic challenge
to INTELSAT).
6. See infra notes 7-27 and accompanying text (discussing how the development of
separate satellite systems will effect INTELSAT).
7. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. XIV. As a signatory to both
INTELSAT agreements, the United States is, of course, bound by its terms. One of
the Agreement's provisions states that INTELSAT members may only establish sepa-
rate satellite systems for the purposes of their respective national security unless they
are authorized by a certain number of other members. Id. Hence, any attempt by pri-
vate United States firms to establish such separate, non-security satellite systems would
likely place the United States government at odds with the Agreement to which it is
bound. Id.
8. Presidential Determination No. 85-2 (Nov. 28, 1984), reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg.
1570, 1579 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Determination].
9. It should be mentioned that a Presidential Determination or Interagency foreign
policy guideline is not legally binding on the FCC.
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Commerce sent a letter, the White Paper, to the FCC explaining the
scope of these restrictions.10 The White Paper recommended that the
FCC only authorize licenses for communication services not intercon-
nected with public-switch message networks," and that the FCC con-
suit one or more foreign authorities to ensure United States compliance
with the INTELSAT Agreement. 2 It is clear that these restrictions
were formulated in order to bring United States policy in line with Ar-
ticle XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement." Article XIV(a) provides
that where INTELSAT members intend to establish separate space
segment facilities, they must consult with the Assembly of Parties
through the Board of Governors to ensure that their facilities are tech-
nically compatible with those at INTELSAT and to avoid significantly
harming the INTELSAT global system.14 Accepting the White Paper's
10. White Paper in International Satellite Systems: Senior Interagency Group on
International Communications and Information Policy, 1 (Feb. 1985). The Presidential
Determination directed both the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of State to in-
form the FCC of the criteria that should be used in authorizing private international
satellite ventures. Id. Following a joint study conducted by the Senior Interagency
Group on International Communications and Information Policy, the White Paper was
produced purporting to delineate the Executive branch's non-binding policy on the mat-
ter and to explain the basis behind the President's determination. Id.
11. See The World on the Line, THE EcONor.sT 6, 7 (1985) (providing an exam-
ple of how the many telecommunication systems operate). A public switch network
delivers communication services through various publicly owned transmission facilities.
Id. Persons wishing to communicate through these systems must interconnect their
transmissions with common carriers, such as AT&T. Id. A public switch network is
often considered synonymous with the telephone network. Id.
12. Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order in the Matter of Es-
tablishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, C.C. Docket
No. 48-1299, F.C.C. 85-399 (adopted July 25, 1985; released Sept. 3, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Report and Order]. The precise language of the restrictions reads:
(1) Each system is to be restricted to providing services through the sale or long
term lease of transponders of space segment capacity for communications not
interconnected with public-switch message networks (except for emergency ser-
vice); and,
2) one or more foreign authorities are to authorize use of each system and enter
into consultation procedures with the United States party under Article XIV(d)
of the INTELSAT Agreement to ensure technical compatibility and avoid signif-
icant economic harm.
Id.
13. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. XIV(d). This provision au-
thorizes the establishment, acquisition, and utilization of other satellite systems. Id.
Generally, to obtain such authorization, a party or signatory of the agreements must
prove to the other INTELSAT members that the proposed systems arc technically
compatible with and will not cause significant economic harm to INTELSAT. Id. The
President's two restrictions were meant to guarantee U.S. compliance with this provi-
sion. Id.
14. Id. See also INTELSAT, "Procedural Manual for Consultation Under Article
XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement," May 1986 (available upon request at INTEL-
SAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (issuing guidelines for INTELSAT members
and users clarifying the consultation procedure under Article XIV(d) of the Agree-
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recommendations almost without reservation, the FCC, in September,
1985, approved several corporate applications and thereby gave the pri-
vate applicants the authority to operate new international satellite
facilities.1 5
The crucial issue now facing INTELSAT is the economic impact the
new United States policies, favoring the establishment of separate
transoceanic satellite systems, will have on the organization. The sub-
stance of the policy guidelines coupled with the restrictive legal struc-
ture of INTELSAT indicate that economic harm is inevitable.
The White Paper's two constraints on the new United States policy
will not limit INTELSAT's exposure to direct competition. Rather, the
problems resulting from the constraints are two-fold. First, the consul-
tation restriction provides a means to evade specific consulting proce-
dures set forth in the Agreement,' 8 in that it allows the FCC considera-
ment). The document describes the procedural stages of the process and lists eight
steps specifically. Id. First, the party or signatory requests in writing consultation under
the Article. Id. This request is made to the Executive Organ which then must make
efforts to obtain sufficient information for an effective evaluation of the request. Id.
Thereafter, the Director General's staff must evaluate the technical and economic ele-
ments of the request. Id. The fourth step involves the Director General submitting his
technical compatibility assessment to the Board of Governors and the Board's Techni-
cal Committee. Id. Following some internal coordination of the staff, the Director Gen-
eral then submits his overall evaluation and suggestions to the Board. Id. Sixth, the
Board of Governors Technical Committee makes an independent assessment of the Di-
rector General's technical compatibility conclusion. Id. The Board of Governors reviews
these two conclusions and reports its own determination to the Assembly of Parties. Id.
Finally, the Assembly then makes its recommendation based on both its reading of the
Article XIV(d) elements and its findings in regard to the advice given. Id.
15. See Report and Order, supra note 12, at 3-4 (providing a list of companies that
filed applications). The companies are Orion Satellite Corporation (Orion) filing on
March 11, 1983; International Satellite, Inc. (ISI) filing on August 12, 1983; RCA
America Communications, Inc. (RCA) filing on February 13, 1984; Cygnus Satellite
Corporation (Cygnus) filing on March 7, 1984; Pan American Satellite Corporation
(PanAmSat) filing on May 31, 1984; and Financial Satellite Corporation (FINAN-
SAT) filing on May 17, 1985. In its Report and Order, the FCC made a lengthy analy-
sis of the issues it reviewed in examining the applications. There were five major issues
considered. First, potential economic benefits to the public. Id. at 4. Second, the impact
and enforceability of Executive Branch restrictions (i.e., the Presidential Determina-
tion). Id. Third, whether competing satellite systems will cause economic harm to IN-
TELSAT rising to the standard of "significant" as provided for in Article XIV(d) of
the INTELSAT Agreement. Id. Fourth, issues effecting authorization of the separate
satellite systems. Id. at 5. Fifth, a discussion of the licensing policies to enforce the
qualifications of a satellite system operator. Id. The FCC concluded that although sep-
arate satellite systems are justified economically and legally, Executive Branch restric-
tions are necessary to maintain United States obligations under the INTELSAT agree-
ment. Id.
16. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. XIV. Article XIV states that
prior to the establishment of a separate satellite facility, a party or signatory:
shall furnish all relevant information to and shall consult with the Assembly of
Parties, through the Board of Governors, to ensure technical compatibility of
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ble flexibility to circumvent the Agreement's requirements and that it
authorizes the FCC to grant licenses to private firms that would other-
wise represent harmful competition for INTELSAT. Because certain
countries with high density communication needs would benefit signifi-
cantly from separate satellite services, 17 it is unlikely that such coun-
tries, acting in a consultant capacity, would force the United States to
comply strictly with Article XIV(d). Second, the restriction limiting
the corporate applicant's proposed service operations to private-switch
services"' is equally ineffective in controlling a direct competitive con-
frontation between the new private satellite systems and INTELSAT.
The Executive policy purports to leave INTELSAT with a monopoly
on those services (public-switch networks) that comprise the vast ma-
jority of international telecommunications traffic. 19 Because the tele-
communications services that are demanded are continually changing,
this constraint is deceptively fragile. Indeed, most market experts agree
that telecommunications traffic is becoming increasingly saturated with
higher levels of private customized services.20 It appears, therefore, that
such facilities and their operation with the use of radio frequency and orbital
space by existing or planned INTELSAT space segment [satellite] and to avoid
significant economic harm to the global system of INTELSAT.
Id. The provision also requires that the consultation provides "assurance that the provi-
sion or utilization of such facilities shall not prejudice the establishment of direct tele-
communication links through the INTELSAT space segment among all the partici-
pants." Id. Obviously by requiring only that the FCC consult with a few foreign
authorities, the United States is encouraging the circumvention of the Agreement pro-
cedure mandating consultation with the entire Assembly of Parties.
17. See Taylor, Current Trends in Regulation, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: A SOURCEBOOK, at 90 (ed. J. Yurow 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Current Trends] (noting that high volume communication routes often subsi-
dize the lower volume route). If the high volume routes actually do subsidize the low
volume routes, it would follow that areas with high volume communication demands.
such as the United States and Western Europe, would stand to gain from services ca-
tering specifically to these needs.
18. See generally Rohwer, The World on the Line, THE EcoNoMIsT 5-40 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as World on Line] (providing a good introductory discussion on the
entire networking process). Private switched services are generally those communica-
tion services that do not rely on the facilities of the public switched networks. Id.
Through the use of private switched services, the user bypasses both local and long
distance public carriers by sending signals directly to another user, usually by satellite.
Id.
19. See id. at 5 (estimating that voice traffic carried on public switched (telephone)
networks today still accounts for approximately 90% of telecommunication services).
20. Id. at 7. Computer networking would be very responsive to the kind of services
provided by private switched systems. Users operating out of the same computer data
bases could be linked directly without having to hook into the public switched network.
Consequently, some observers question whether President Reagan's restriction on pro-
viding such a hook-up for the new systems will even have an impact on the new com-
petitors. Id. Moreover, given this inherent compatibility between the private switched
networks and computer data transmissions, an increase in the use of personal com-
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because INTELSAT would expect to carry such services in the near
future,2" the new United States systems would undoubtedly pose a
threat to INTELSAT 22 and would thereby be distinguishable from pre-
viously authorized separate satellite systems.23
B. IMPACT OF PRIVATE SATELLITE CORPORATIONS ON INTELSAT
The assumption that direct competition will cause INTELSAT great
economic harm is completely justified. There are a number of legal
constraints on INTELSAT that would limit its ability to compete with
the newer separate systems. Article III(a) of the Agreement, for exam-
ple, requires INTELSAT to provide global services regardless of the
cost inefficiencies connected with certain geographic areas.2 4 The pri-
vate satellite systems, however, are free to service only the high density,
profitable areas. INTELSAT, therefore, is now placed at a devastating
puters will only benefit the new independent satellite corporations more. Id. The Gart-
ner Group, a private Connecticut consultant, predicts that while only I of the 4 million
office personal computers were in the networks in 1984, by 1989 nearly 19 million or
75% will be linked to other computers. Id.
21. See INTELSAT, Press Release 86-33 (May 22, 1986) (available upon request
at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (suggesting that INTELSAT is al-
ready introducing a new line of services gauged for customized private users. In ad-
dressing the Second General Assembly and Congress of the World Teleport Associa-
tion on May 22, Deputy Director General of INTELSAT David T. Tudge declared
INTELSAT's commitment to providing smaller, more efficient and more easily accessi-
ble earth stations that would offer a greater variety of service options. Id. He stated
further that two new services, INTELSAT Business Service (IBS) and INTELNET,
will encourage more use of these stations. Id. Both services provide the user with an
array of applications similar to those that would be used through private customized
services (e.g., distribution of financial information, environmental and scientific data,
cash management operations, and video-conferencing).
22. See Colino, The Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite Systems: Interna-
tional Satellite Communications at the Crossroads, 24 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 13, 20
(1985) [hereinafter cited as At the Crossroads] (expressing Director General's view
that the United States system will essentially duplicate INTELSAT services); see also
INTELSAT, ANNUAL REPORT 1984-1985, at 9 (detailing the resolution passed at the
Ninth [extraordinary] Meeting of the Assembly of Parties wherein the delegations ex-
pressed deep concern over the potential impact the similar services of the United States
might have on INTELSAT).
23. See At the Crossroads, supra note 22, at 19-20 n.18 (noting that the INTEL-
SAT Assembly has approved a number of separate satellite systems on the basis that
they do not divert much traffic from the INTELSAT system (e.g., the Indonesian sys-
tem of PALAPA)). Other times, however, INTELSAT has been reluctant to prohibit
international traffic that was merely incidental to transmissions from already existing
domestic systems (e.g., the use of Galaxy I between the United States and Mexico). Id.
24. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. IIl(a). It has been estimated that
over 50% of the 1,500 INTELSAT earth stations generate less than 10% of its reve-
nues. See Intelsat, Final Report of the Study of the Economics of International Satel-
lite Communications 8 (May 18, 1984) (Attachment No. I to BG-59-34E) (prepared
by Walter Hinchman & Associates, Inc.), cited in At the Crossroads, supra note 22, at
21.
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economic disadvantage. In addition, the Agreement provision setting
forth the concept of global averaging of prices also limits INTELSAT's
ability to effectively compete with the private sector. 21 These price re-
straints prohibit INTELSAT from charging different rates for services
between different locations. INTELSAT is legally required to charge
the same rate for services among highly dense areas as for services
among highly remote, low density areas. New private firms, however,
would be free to charge different rates for different links and hence
market their services to the most lucrative communication links.
The United States Congress has recently addressed INTELSAT's in-
flexibility to compete. Both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives approved the Department of State Authorization Bill that author-
ized COMSAT,26 as the United States signatory, to propose
amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement that would give the organi-
zation greater pricing flexibility. 7 Until such amendments are enacted,
however, INTELSAT does not have the means to effectively compete
with the emerging private satellite systems. Moreover, because the cur-
rent United States policy does not discourage such competition, it is
safe to assume that INTELSAT must soon revise its current policies
and by-laws so that it can maintain its strong position in the interna-
tional satellite market.
II. INTELSAT AND THE CHALLENGE OF FIBER OPTIC
TECHNOLOGY
Whereas the emergence of separate satellite systems threatens IN-
TELSAT's hold on certain service markets, new technological develop-
ments in fiber optics imperil the entire satellite industry in that they
provide alternative telecommunication facilities.
A controversy has recently emerged as to which means of telecom-
25. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V(d) (providing that rates
"for each type of utilization shall be the same for all applicants for space segment
capacity for that type of utilization"). The principle behind adopting this provision is
spelled out in the Agreement's preamble which states that "communications by means
of satellite should be available to the nations of the world on a global and non-discrimi-
nating basis." Id. at preamble.
26. See Current Trends, supra note 17, at 88-94. COMSAT is the Communication
Satellite Corporation created by Congress under the Communication Satellite Act of
1962, 47 U.S.C. § 767, et seq. (1976). Id. COMSAT is the United States signatory to
INTELSAT and generally functions as a carriers carrier which, in turn provide ser-
vices directly to the public or end users. Id. In this capacity, under the auspices of the
United States government, COMSAT serves as a monopoly supplier of international
transmission facilities within the United States. Id.
27. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 146. 99 Stat. 405,
425 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2651) (1985).
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munications provides greater efficiency at lower costs.2 8 Although dif-
ferent in the form of their transmission, 29 each industry claims that its
system has greater loading capacity which allows it to transmit more
information. Studies indicate that due to refinements in the production
of fiber optics, cables using this medium may have triple the capacity
by the early 1990's.8 0 With the prospect of transoceanic fiber optic
cable systems becoming a reality, there is speculation that the number
of cable transmissions will increase tremendously.3" A special INTEL-
SAT commissioned study of fiber optic cables and satellites concluded,
however, that when the two systems are compared, the use of satellites
is a more cost efficient system for the same quality of services ren-
dered.3 2 Despite having been commissioned by INTELSAT, the study
recommended that INTELSAT and the private sector use both tech-
nologies to strengthen and compliment one another.3
Although debates over which system is more efficient will no doubt
continue, it is clear that for the immediate future both types of facili-
ties are needed to meet the rising demands of the communications
28. See INTELSAT, Press Release 86-36 (June 4, 1986) (available upon request
at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (providing Deputy Director General
of INTELSAT's argument for Satellite superiority over fiber optic networking in com-
munication services); see also Current Trends, supra note 17, at 89-91 (comparing the
two systems by exploring their strengths and weaknesses).
29. See Cummins, Lemus, Reyna, and Crispin, Satellites versus Fiber Optic
Cables, INTELSAT, 1985, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Satellite versus Fiber Optics]
(prepared for the Pacific Telecommunications Council Conference of 1985 and availa-
ble upon request at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (describing the ap-
plications and technical aspects of satellite communications and fiber optics). A fiber
optic cable is a direct point-to-point transmission facility. Id. For example, where a
cable is installed from point A to point B, another cable must be installed to point C if
either point A or B wants to transmit to C. Id. By contrast, satellites are multipoint to
multipoint communication facilities. Id. Consequently, many different earth stations
may access a single satellite to receive transmissions. Id.
30. Current Trends, supra note 17, at 89-90. The first transoceanic submarine
cable, placed in the Atlantic in 1956, was capable of furnishing only thirty-six, two-
way voice circuits. Today, the newest cable authorized for construction can provide
4000 voice circuits. Id. By the late 1980's or early 1990's, fiberoptic submarine cables
will have, at the very least, a capacity of 12,000 voice grade circuits plus television
transmission capability. Id.
31. See Current Trends, supra note 17, at 91 (stating that with the development of
fiber optics, digital technology will also expand the variety of services cable systems
will be able to offer).
32. Satellite versus Fiber Optics, supra note 29, at 2-5. The study concluded that
cable's point-to-point capacity is the less cost effective use of communication transmis-
sion facilities. Id. It is also observed that satellite facilities are advantageous in that
they have an already established global transmissions network. Id.
33. Id. See also INTELSAT, Press Release 86-36 (June 4, 1986) (available upon
request at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (noting that the INTELSAT
satellite system may provide total "back-up" capabilities for fiber optic undersea cables
and that the two systems are by no means mutually incompatible).
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revolution. 4 Until that revolution subsides, the competitive threat of
fiber optic cables for INTELSAT will be more remote than the threat
of separate satellite systems.
IV. OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. INTELSAT And The Geostationary Satellite Orbit
The geostationary satellite orbit (G.S.O.) is an orbitral ring approxi-
mately 22,300 miles (35,800 kilometers) above the earth's equator. In
this orbit, a satellite may maintain a fairly stable position relative to
the earth, turning around the earth's equator in the same direction and
time period as the earth.3 5 Since the space available for satellites in this
"three-dimensional corridor" is limited," a major international issue
exists regarding the method of assigning countries to the G.S.O. This
question of allocating access is divided along economic lines with the
United States and other developed nations favoring allocation on a
first-come, first-serve basis, 37 while the lesser technologically developed
nations support a more equitable access that guarantees G.S.O. use
through advance planning.3
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 9 recently at-
tempted to resolve this issue at the September, 1985, World Adminis-
trative Conference in Geneva.40 The Conference for the first time rec-
34. See generally World on Line, supra note 18 (describing how the merging of
computer and traditional voice and wire communications will ultimately change both
the commercial and technological aspects of telecommunications).
35. See Final Acts of the 1929 World Administrative Radio Conference, Radio
Regulations, No. 182, at 47, 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (defining the term geostationary satellite
orbit).
36. See Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 Abi. J.
INT'L L. 144 (1979) (discussing generally the allocation of space problem). There are a
number of problems that the rejected orbital space presents. Considerable concern cen-
ters on preventing electromagnetic interference with other satellites and radio spectrum
users. Consequently, some form of cooperation must be developed between countries to
share this area.
37. See THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INTER-
NATIONAL TELECOMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION POLICY, SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE
1980's: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SENATE CONINI. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (Comm. Print 1983) (Summerizing major issues in telecommuni-
cations within a framework of international entities that regulate telecommunications).
38. Id. at 10.
39. International Telecommunication Convention, Final Acts of the International
Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.) Plenipotentiary Conference, done Oct. 25, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572. The I.T.U. is a specialized agency of the United
Nations that provides a forum for the development and coordination of international
telecommunications. Id.
40. See Report on the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the
Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It: A Report
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ognized INTELSAT as a common-user organization. Before this
recognition, developing nations had to rely on other, regional common-
user systems. This recognition means that INTELSAT could hereafter
provide developing nations with actual, direct access to the G.S.O.
4
1
Consequently, INTELSAT's role in providing access to the G.S.O. is
now considerably more significant.
B. INTELSAT AND THE RECENT SET-BACKS IN SATELLITE
LAUNCHES
On May 30, 1986, INTELSAT's attempt to launch its V-A (F-14)
communications satellite failed as the European Space Agency, Ari-
anespace, was compelled to blow up the rocket minutes after its launch
from Kouroo, French Guiana. According to the officials at Arianes-
pace, the action to abort the launch occurred when the rocket and its
$55 million satellite payload moved out of its trajectory and threatened
to disappear from the reach of the radio detonation signal. 2 Although
NASA has recently experienced similar launch failures, 43 Director
General Richard R. Colino has made it clear that INTELSAT will not
alter its commitment to launch its satellites with both Arianespace and
NASA in the future.
CONCLUSION
Both the imminent emergence of private United States satellite cor-
porations in the satellite service marketplace and the technological de-
velopment of fiber optic cables will fundamentally transform interna-
tional telecommunications. While recent, less significant developments
to the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties Tenth Meeting, Oct. 7-10, 1985, at 28 (availa-
ble upon request at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (providing a con-
densed fact paper about the I.T.U. Conference).
41. Many commentators had already recommended employing INTELSAT as a
common-user. See Pelton, INTELSAT States ITS Case, SATELLITE WORLD, 20-24
(1985) (discussing how developing countries could take advantage of common-user sys-
tems, such as INTELSAT, and obtain reliable and inexpensive satellite technology); D.
Demac, et al., Equity in Orbit: The 1985 I.T.U. Space W.A.R.C.: A Background Pa-
per, International Institute of Communications, London, England, June, 1985, at 7-8
(emphasizing that common-user systems could provide a critical step to solving the
problems of equitable access to the G.S.O.).
42. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1986, at 33, col. 3.
43. Id. The U.S. has experienced five launched failures in the past year. In addition
to the space shuttle on January 28, 1986, two Air Force Titen 34-D rockets, a Delta
rocket launched by NASA, and a Nike-Orien rocket have all failed to be successfully
lauched. See also INTELSAT, Press Release 8686-35 (May 30, 1986) (available upon
request at INTELSAT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) (labeling launch failure as
merely a temporary setback).
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indicate that INTELSAT can adapt to a changing telecommunications
environment, the dual competitive threat of separate satellite networks
and new fiber optic technology will clearly present INTELSAT with its
greatest challenge. More specifically, INTELSAT is now faced with
having to meet this competition without damaging its own cooperative
structure; a structure that has enjoyed considerable success over the
past twenty years.
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